State v. Valencia Appellant\u27s Brief 2 Dckt. 41796 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
12-1-2014
State v. Valencia Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 41796
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Valencia Appellant's Brief 2 Dckt. 41796" (2014). Not Reported. 1809.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1809
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
JULIAN MARTIN VALENCIA, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________ ) 
NO. 41796 
CANYON COUNTY NO. CR 2013-2874 
REVISED APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
REVISED BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE GEORGE A. SOUTHWORTH 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
REED P. ANDERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9307 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 
Boise, ID 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720m0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEY FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... ·! 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................. 8 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 9 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Valencia's 
Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea ........................................................................... 9 
A. Introduction ...................................................................................................... 9 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................................................... 9 
C. Mr. Valencia Showed A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
Because His Plea Was Not Made Voluntarily, Knowingly, And 
Intelligently ..................................................................................................... 1 O 
D. Granting The Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea Would Not Have 
Prejudiced The State, And The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Found That There Was Prejudice To The State Based 
Only On The Fact That The Alleged Victim Could Be Called 
To Testify ....................................................................................................... 14 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 16 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 17 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Cf State v. Grist, 14 7 Idaho 49 (2009) ................................................................ 15 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50 (2004) .......................................................... :10, 14 
Morris v. Slappy, 45·1 U.S. ·J (1983) ................................................................... :16 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) ......................................................... 2 
State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219 (2008) ....................................................... 9, 10, 13 
State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988) .......................................................... 10, 14 
State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................................ 10 
State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999) ............................................ 1-1 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886 (Ct App. 2002) ..................................... ., ........ 10 
State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330 (Ct. App. 2009) ................................................... 10 
U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) ................................................................... 14 
Statutes 
I.C. § 18-911 ......................................................................................................... 1 
I.C. § 18-920(3) ..................................................................................................... 1 
Rules 
Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(10) ............................................................................... 2 
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) ..................................................................................... 9 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 .......................................................................................... 7 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Julian Martin Valencia pleaded guilty to battery 
with the intent to commit a serious felony (rape). Mr. Valencia later filed a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, which the district court denied. The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Valencia asserts the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In January of 2013, Sara Negrete reported to the Nampa police that Julian Martin 
Valencia had sexually assaulted her. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, 
PSI), p.2.) Ms. Negrete said that she was staying at her friend's apartment when the 
assault occurred. (PSI, p.2.) Mr. Valencia was her friend's boyfriend. (PSI, p.2.) When 
interviewed regarding the incident, Mr. Valencia confirmed that he was at his girlfriend's 
apartment despite the fact that there were three no contact orders between them. (PSI, 
p.3.) Mr. Valencia said he had been drinking with his girlfriend and Ms. Negrete and 
admitted that he went to Ms. Negrete's bedroom later and penetrated her with his 
fingers. (PSI, p.3.) He was originally charged with battery with intent to commit a 
serious felony to wit: rape, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-911, and violation of a no 
contact order (third offense within five years), felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-920(3). 
(R., pp.8-10.) He was offered two plea agreement options: a binding Rule 11 
agreement for both charges, and an offer to plead guilty to the battery charge only. 
1 
(Tr. 7/11/13, p.5.) He chose the latter. 1 (Tr. 7/11/13, p.5.) Therefore, in July of 2013, 
Mr. Valencia entered an Alford2 plea to the charge of battery with intent to commit a 
serious felony, and the State agreed to dismiss the other charge and recommend four 
years fixed with the indeterminate portion of the sentence to remain open for argument. 
(Tr. 7/11/13, p.7.) 
Shortly thereafter, on September 25, 2013 (two days before Mr. Valencia's 
psychosexual evaluation was filed with the district court3 ) Mr. Valencia's counsel 
(J. Scott Dowdy) filed a motion to withdraw as counsel of record for Mr. Valencia. 
(R., pp.66-67.) In that motion, Mr. Dowdy explained that Mr. Valencia had asked him to 
file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., p.66.) Mr. Dowdy also stated that Mr. Valencia believed that he was not properly 
advised on the consequences of his guilty plea, and that this rendered his plea 
involuntary and unknowing. (R., p.66.) Therefore, Mr. Dowdy asked to be allowed to 
withdraw, as it would be "impossible to further represent Defendant in his request for a 
withdrawal of plea on this basis."4 (R., p.66.) 
1 Judge Ford was initially presiding over the case because the no contact order violation 
was assigned to him. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.6.) However, because Mr. Valencia decided to 
plead guilty to the battery charge only, which was assigned to Judge Southworth, Judge 
Ford asked Judge Southworth to step in. (Tr. 7/11/13, p.6.) He did so immediately, and 
this obviously troubled Mr. Valencia, as his counsel said that he had anticipated that 
Judge Ford would be handling the case, so he was apprehensive to move forward with 
a plea because he had never been in front of Judge Southworth. (Tr. 7/11/13, pp.8-9.) 
Nevertheless, he pleaded guilty. (Tr. 7 /11 /13, p.10.) Judge Southworth presided over 
the proceedings from this point forward. 
2 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
3 The PSI was filed with the district court on September 9, 2013, but the psychosexual 
evaluation was not filed until September 27, 2013. (PSI, p.1; Psychosexual Evaluation 
cover letter.) Idaho Criminal Rule 32(b)(10) states that the psychosexual evaluation 
must be part of the PSI. Thus, Mr. Valencia should not have received either of those 
documents until September 27, 2013 at the earliest. 
4 There were indications that there was a lack of communication developing between 
Mr. Valencia and Mr. Dowdy well before Mr. Dowdy filed his motion to withdraw as 
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At the subsequent hearing on Mr. Dowdy's rnotion, the district court said that it 
had just met with both of the attorneys in chambers and learned that 
[t]he defendant Mr. Valencia filed some sort of motion with the case that 
was ex parte without copies going to both parties, indicated he was very 
unhappy with Mr. Dowdy's representation of him, not wanting Mr. Dowdy 
to represent him anymore, and threatening Mr. Dowdy that he would be 
reported to the State Bar Association.5 
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.6, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Valencia's motion was entitled "Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea" and was addressed to the district court, but the district court had not read it; 
there was a stamp on it stating that, "Pursuant to administrative order #98-1," it had 
been "opened by court personnel" but had not been "read or reviewed by the judge." 
(Letter and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (file stamped 10/2/'13) - augmented to the 
record contemporaneously.) In that motion, Mr. Valencia said he was "misled, 
misinformed, tricked, coerced, and threatened to plead guilty .... " (Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, 
Ls.5-9.) Based on these facts, the district court said that "[i]t would be an obvious 
violation of ethical duties to require" Mr. Dowdy to continue to represent Mr. Valencia 
and granted Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw as counsel. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, Ls.15-21; 
R., pp.70-71.) 
The district court then told Mr. Valencia that he was no longer represented by 
counsel and said it would "reappoint the public defender's office to represent" him. 
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.8, L.22 - p.9, L.6.) It also reset his sentencing hearing for December 
16, 2013, and said that this would "give defense counsel a chance to contact you, see 
how you want to proceed, and proceed with filing whatever motions you feel it is 
counsel. For example, Mr. Valencia did not complete his "Defendant's Version" of the 
incident for the PSI. Instead, he wrote "My attorney never came to see me. He was 
supposed to come on the 8th of August to help me fill it out. I'm sorry." (PSI, p.3.) 
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appropriate for your defense counsel to file then." (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, Ls.13-17.) 
Mr. Valencia then said, "Well, when I spoke with Mr. Dowdy on September 16th ... I 
spoke with him and told him that I wanted to withdraw my plea.' (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, 
Ls. ·18-21.) The district court told Mr. Valencia to talk with his new attorney about any 
motions he wanted to file. (Tr. 10/2'1/13, p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) 
Mr. Valencia was not able to file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, through 
his newly-appointed public defender (Ryan Dowell), until December 13, 2013. 
(R., pp.73-76.) In that motion, he asserted that he felt "his prior counsel misled him 
which led him to enter a guilty plea." (R., p.73.) Further, he argued that the State would 
not be prejudiced by the withdrawal of his plea, as the case could be reset for trial. 
(R., p.73.) The motion also explained that Mr. Valencia felt "pressured to accept the 
offered resolution and has since determined that a jury trial would be a more 
appropriate resolution of the case" because he did not feel that "he committed the crime 
as alleged." (R., p.75.) 
At the subsequent hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, Mr. Dowell 
pointed out that Mr. Valencia was misled by his former counsel because there were 
erroneous representations made to him regarding Idaho's persistent violator statute. 
(Tr.12/30/13, p.13, Ls.11-18.) In short, Mr. Dowell argued that based on the fact that 
Mr. Valencia had one prior felony conviction, and his former counsel's representations 
regarding the two instant offenses, Mr. Valencia came to believe that he could be 
subject to the persistent violator enhancement if he did not plead guilty. (Tr. 12/30/14, 
p.13, L.11-p.14, L.19.) 
5 See Letter and Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (file stamped 10/2/13) - augmented to 
the record contemporaneously. This motion was signed and notarized; it was dated 
September 21, 2013. 
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Mr. Dowell explained that this was misleading because of established precedent 
holding that convictions entered the same day or charged in the same information 
should count as a single conviction for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement. 
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.10-19.) Therefore, the violation of the no contact orders and the 
battery charge would count as a single conviction only. Thus, he suggested that 
Mr. Valencia's prior counsel made inaccurate representations to him that led him to 
plead guilty instead of opting to proceed to trial. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.3-25.) In sum, 
he said Mr. Valencia felt "manipulated" to plead guilty based on the representations of 
his prior counsel. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.14, Ls.20-22.) 
The State argued that the case law was clear with respect to the fact that when 
the district court decides on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea after the presentence 
investigation is complete, it should look more "skeptically" on that motion and the 
motives behind it. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.15, L.12 - p.16, L.4.) And the district court stated 
that there was no "threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not 
part of the plea agreement." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.22-25.) 
The State also argued that there would be prejudice to the State if Mr. Valencia's 
motion was granted. It explained that this case was unique because "this isn't a dope 
case" or "a theft case of a store. This is a case involving a situation where the defendant 
is charged with battery with the intent to commit a serious felony, to wit, rape." 
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.3-11.) Therefore, there was a "victim who goes through the 
victim cycle." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, Ls.16-19.) Based on that, the State asserted that 
"while there may not be a ton of prejudice because I have to go back and try this case, 
there certainly is prejudice to the victim" because "she now has to relive the night in 
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question, even though she's been given that opportunity to move forward, that obviously 
provides prejudice." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.18, Ls.1-20.) 
In reply, Mr. Dowell said that, when he first started working with Mr. Valencia and 
discussing the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Mr. Valencia told him that he had not 
yet seen the presentence investigation or the psychosexual evaluation. (Tr. ·12/30/13, 
p.19, Ls.12-24.) And, with respect to the prejudice issue, Mr. Valencia's counsel 
pointed out that "the psychological issues that the alleged victim may have in this 
matter" did not amount to prejudice to the State. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.14-20.) He 
argued that the State was not prejudiced because "they can still call their witnesses to 
trial. All their witnesses should still be available." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.20-23.) 
The district court found that the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was "only filed 
after a very negative psychosexual evaluation was performed and a presentence 
investigation report that recommended prison." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.13-16.) 
Additionally, it said that it believed there was prejudice to the State, "specifically 
prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter had reached a resolution and the 
sentence was going forward." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, L.23 - p.22, L.2.) Thus it denied the 
motion and set the matter for sentencing. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.22, Ls. 7-9.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the district court impose a 
unified sentence of twenty years, with four years fixed. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.33, Ls.2-6.) 
Mr. Valencia's counsel recommended that the district court impose a unified sentence of 
six years, with one and one-half years fixed, but retain jurisdiction so that Mr. Valencia 
could participate in a rider program and sex offender treatment. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.37, L.23 
- p.38, L.9.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with four years 
fixed. (Tr. 1/10/14, p.44, Ls.22-25; R., pp.94-95.) Mr. Valencia filed a notice of appeal 
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that was timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.100-103.) He also filed an 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency, but the district court denied that 
motion as welL 6 (R., pp.86-93, 110-113.) 
6 Mr. Valencia is not challenging the denial of his Rule 35 motion. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Valencia's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
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A. 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Valencia's Motion To 
Withdraw His Guiltv Plea 
Introduction 
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Valencia's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea because he showed a just reason to withdraw his plea, and 
there was no prejudice to the State. Mr. Valencia showed a just reason to withdraw his 
plea because, based on inaccurate representations of his counsel, he did not 
understand his options, and this rendered his plea involuntary and unknowing. Also, 
allowing Mr. Valencia to withdraw his plea would not have prejudiced the State-
exercising a constitutional right to a jury trial, and requiring the State to prove its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt - even if it requires the victim to undergo the unpleasant 
experience of testifying or being uncertain of the outcome - does not amount to 
"prejudice." 
8. Standard Of Review 
Motions to withdraw guilty pleas are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c). 
"The decision to grant a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the sound discretion of 
the district court," and that discretion should be "liberally applied." State v. Arthur, 145 
Idaho 219, 222 (2008). An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea to determine "whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as 
distinguished from arbitrary action." Id. 
9 
C. Plea Because His 
When a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is made before sentencing, a defendant 
on!y has to show a "just reason" to withdraw the plea. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 
801 (1988). However, if the motion is made before sentencing but "after the defendant 
has learned of the content of the PSI or has received other information about the 
probable sentence, the district court may temper its liberality by weighing the 
defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. Also, if the State can show 
prejudice as a result of the withdrawal, a motion to withdraw the plea will be denied. 
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 (2004 ). In this case, neither of these situations 
applies-Mr. Valencia made his desire to withdraw his plea known before the PSI was 
issued, and the State did not identify any prejudice to the State. Mr. Valencia also had 
a just reason to withdraw his plea, and thus his motion should have been granted. 
A defendant can show a just reason to withdraw a guilty plea if his plea was 
involuntary. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-536 (Ct. App. 2008). "If a plea 
was not taken in compliance with constitutional due process standards, which require 
that a guilty plea be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, then ... 'just reason' 
will be established as a matter of law." State v. Stone, 147 Idaho 330, 333 (Ct. App. 
2009). A plea complies with these standards when: 
(1) the plea was voluntary in the sense that the defendant understood the 
nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) the defendant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront adverse 
witnesses, and to avoid self-incrimination; and (3) the defendant 
understood the consequences of pleading guilty. 
State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886, 887 (Ct. App. 2002). Here, Mr. Valencia's plea was 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because, as a result of being misinformed about 
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the law regarding the persistent violator statute, he pleaded guilty. Mr. Valencia 
believed that he could be subject to the persistent violator statute if he did not plead 
guilty because his original counsel (Mr. Dowdy) led him to believe that the two charges 
he was facing would amount to his second and third felonies for the purpose of the 
persistent violator statute. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.13, L.11 - p.14, L.·19.) This was not 
supported by the law. Charges in the same information "count as a single conviction for 
purposes of establishing habitual offender status." State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 
565 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus, Mr. Valencia was not at risk of being subject to the 
persistent violator statute as he believed. Therefore, he did not knowingly and 
intelligently waive his right to a trial. 
In denying Mr. Valencia's motion, the district court focused on the idea that "there 
was never any threat by the State to file the persistent violator because that was not 
part of the plea agreement." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.16, Ls.22-25.) But this is irrelevant. 
Mr. Valencia obviously believed, as a result of his prior counsel's erroneous 
representations, that if he chose to go to trial, the State could later file an amended 
information charging the persistent violator enhancement. This is also supported by 
Mr. Valencia's guilty plea advisory form, which he completed on July 8, 2013. There, in 
response to the question of whether any promises had been made that influenced his 
decision to plead guilty, Mr. Valencia wrote "Plea agreement & No file persistent" and 
"Dismiss 3 Counts felony NCO." (R., p.54.) 
More importantly, the district court erred when it found that "the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea was only filed after a very negative psychosexual evaluation 
was performed and a presentence investigation report that recommended prison." 
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.13-16.) This finding ignored the fact that the only reason 
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Mr. Valencia's motion was filed after his PSI and psychosexual evaluation were 
completed was because Mr. Valencia could not communicate with his original attorney 
and that attorney withdrew. Even though Mr. Valencia's letter and motion, and certainly 
Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw, made it clear that Mr. Valencia was trying to file his 
motion before he read the PSI, the district court did not recognize that Mr. Valencia's 
problems with Mr. Dowdy made it impossible for him to file a motion to withdraw his plea 
when he wanted to. 
In fact, the timeline makes it clear that Mr. Valencia wanted to file that motion 
well before he saw his PSI. His handwritten motion to withdraw his plea was dated 
September 21, 2013. This was a notarized document. ( See Letter and Motion to 
Withdraw Guilty Plea (file stamped 10/2/13) - augmented to the record 
contemporaneously). But his psychosexual evaluation was not complete until 
September 27, 2013. (See Psychosexual Evaluation.) Therefore, as discussed above, 
he could not have seen the PSI, or the psychosexual evaluation before that date. 
His desire to withdraw his plea early on is also supported by his statement to the 
district court at the hearing on Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw as counsel and certainly 
by the motion itself. That motion was filed on September 25, 2013 and specifically 
stated that "Defendant has requested counsel to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea 
on the premise of ineffective assistance of counsel." (R., pp.66-67.) 
Therefore, Mr. Valencia made at least three attempts to make it clear to the 
district court that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea before the PSI was complete. 
First, he tried to get Mr. Dowdy to file the motion, so the two of them obviously 
discussed it well before the PSI was complete because Mr. Dowdy filed his motion to 
withdraw as counsel on September 25, 2013. (R., pp.66-67.) Second, he tried to file 
12 
his own motion by writing to the district court. (Letter and Motion to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea (file stamped 10/2/13)- augmented to the record contemporaneously.) 
And third, at Mr. Dowdy's motion to withdraw hearing, after the court had reset 
his sentencing hearing for December, Mr. Valencia specificaily said to the district court 
that when he met with Mr. Dowdy on September 16, 2013, he told him that he wanted to 
withdraw his plea. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, Ls.5-21.) But, instead of acknowledging that a 
delay might seriously impact his chances of being able to withdraw his plea, the district 
court simply told Mr. Valencia to talk with his new attorney about motions he wanted to 
file. (Tr. 10/21/13, p.9, L.22 - p.10, L.3.) Mr. Valencia's confusion is evident from the 
transcript. He asked "So what is December 16th? I don't - what is that, my 
sentencing?" The district court explained that it had continued the sentencing to allow 
the new attorney to "discuss with you how you want to proceed on this case." 
(Tr. 10/21/13, p.10, Ls.13-16.) In a clear indication that Mr. Valencia had made up his 
mind about how he wanted to proceed, he answered "I just said I would like to withdraw 
my plea." (Tr. 10/21/13, p.10, Ls.19-20.) But the district court said Mr. Valencia would 
need to talk with his new attorney who would file that motion for him. (Tr. 10/21 /13, 
p.10, Ls.21-25.) 
Because a thorough analysis of the timeline and motions proves that 
Mr. Valencia not only had a just reason for withdrawing his plea but did not have an 
improper motive, the district court should have applied the most liberal standard and 
granted his motion. See Arthur, 145 at 222. Instead, while it actually acknowledged 
that Mr. Valencia's "motion to withdraw the guilty plea was not filed until after the public 
defender had the case again," it did not seem to recall the history of the case. 
(Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.7-13.) Specifically, it did not recall that Mr. Valencia tried to file 
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his motion several times months before. The district court simply said that "certainly the 
presentence investigation report and the psychosexual evaluation were available for 
review prior to those times." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, Ls.7-13.) This statement showed that 
that the district court either disregarded or forgot about Mr. Valencia's attempts to 
withdraw his plea before the PSI and psychosexual report were availabie. Therefore, 
the district court acted arbitrarily and abused its discretion when it denied the motion. 
D. Granting The Motion To Withdraw The Guilty Plea Would Not Have Prejudiced 
The State, And The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Found That 
There Was Prejudice To The State Based Onlv On The Fact That The Alleged 
Victim Could Be Called To Testify 
As indicated above, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea will be denied if the State 
can show prejudice as a result of the withdrawal. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 61 
(2004 ). Prejudice to a party may occur when that party's ability to effectively present its 
case is jeopardized by delay, the destruction of evidence or unavailability of witnesses. 
See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971 ). For example, if a significant 
period of time passes before a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is entered, prejudice to 
the State could certainly occur. In State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799 (1988), after entering 
a guilty plea, the defendant did not appear for sentencing and was not apprehended 
until three years later. Id. at 800. He subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court pointed out that the district court "recognized that 
generally motions to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing are to be liberally allowed" 
but noted with approval that the district court found that "Ballard's circumstances did not 
warrant the granting of his motion." Id. It then quoted the district court, which 
acknowledged that a liberal approach to such motions rests on "good principles," but 
said that those principles "don't have much applicability where the defendant has 
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absented himself for a period of some three years. ! think that is a significant prejudice 
to the prosecution and precludes the withdrawal of the plea at this point." Id. 
Prejudice to the State is not relevant or applicable, however, when an alleged 
victim must testify as a result of a defendant asserting a constitutional right to trial. 
Here, the prosecutor actually acknowledged that there would not be prejudice to the 
State, but then argued that there was "prejudice to the victim" because if the alleged 
victim had to testify at a trial, she would have to "relive the night in question, even 
though she's been given that opportunity to move forward, that obviously provides 
prejudice." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.18, Ls.10-20.) In reply, Mr. Valencia's counsel argued that 
"the psychological issues that the alleged victim may have in this matter" were not 
relevant because the issue "shouid be prejudice to the State." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, 
Ls.14-19.) He said that the State "can still call all their witnesses to trial. All their 
witnesses should still be available." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.20, Ls.19-22.) Nevertheless, the 
district court agreed with the prosecutor. It said "[t]his Court does believe that there is 
prejudice to the State, specifically prejudice to the victim in this case thinking this matter 
had reached a resolution and the sentence was going forward." (Tr. 12/30/13, p.21, 
L.23 - p.22, L.2.) This was a fundamental misunderstanding of the principle of 
prejudice to the State. It allowed a more relaxed standard for a finding of prejudice to 
the State in sex cases. Indeed, the prosecutor even implied that because this was not a 
"dope case" or a "theft case," a different standard should apply. (Tr. 12/30/13, p.17, 
Ls.3-11.) Cf. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51-52 (2009) (clarifying that courts should not 
apply different procedural rules in sex cases). 
While victims' rights are crucial, a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right, 
which requires that an alleged victim testify does not amount to prejudice to the State. 
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In fact, the United States Supreme Court, while recognizing that courts should "not 
ignore the concerns of victims" especially "when the crime is one calling for public 
testimony about a humiliating and degrading experience," made it clear that 
"inconvenience and embarrassment to witnesses cannot justify failing to enforce 
constitutional rights of an accused. When prejudicial error is made that dearly impairs a 
defendant's constitutional rights, the burden of a new trial must be borne by the 
prosecution, the courts, and the witnesses; the Constitution permits nothing less." 
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). This admonition applies here. 
Finally, as Mr. Valencia's counsel was obviously implying when he stated that the 
issue "should be prejudice to the State," a victim being called to testify is not at all 
unusual. It is unfortunate that alleged victims can sometimes be forced to recall painful 
memories, but it is not prejudice to the State. Therefore, the district court abused its 
discretion by considering this as a factor in its denial of Mr. Valencia's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Valencia respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction and remand his case to the district court with direction to grant his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. 
DATED this 1st day of December, 2014. 
r I t 
REED P. ANDERSON ~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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